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In previous research, I find that a reduction of the cost-of-living adjustment has 
performed quite well in comparisons among different Social Security reform 
proposals.  While a COLA reduction contains many positive features, there is some 
concern that it would push the most vulnerable members of the population into further 
poverty.  In this paper, I use the Current Population Survey to simulate the effects of a 
COLA reduction on the incomes of a sample of aged units.  I also consider modified 
COLA reduction plans that would apply only to certain ranges of ages.  I find that 
COLA reductions can create significant effects on the incomes of the population, as 
once the COLA reduction is fully in effect, the incomes of some of the poorest elderly 
could be as much as 10% lower than at present.  Nonetheless, the news is not entirely 
discouraging, as the savings of the COLA reduction to the Trust Fund are many times 
greater than the increased poverty that the COLA reduction would create.  This leaves 
fertile ground to fashion a COLA reduction plan that includes income guarantees for 
the poorest members of the population, while also relieving a great deal of the future 
funding problems expected for the Trust Fund.  
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1   Introduction 
The Social Security system in the United States is projected to remain solvent 
only until 2042, according to the intermediate assumptions of the 2003 Trustee’s 
Report.  To prepare for the anticipated shortfalls, a number of potential remedies have 
been identified.  These proposals generally cut benefits, increase taxes, or seek to 
provide greater returns to Social Security assets.  In comparing different reform plans, 
the results of Chapters 1 and 2 (Pfau (2003a) and (2003b)) indicate that a standard 
cost-of-living adjustment (COLA) reduction performs well relative to a number of 
alternative choices.  A COLA reduction would more evenly distribute the burden of 
reform across Americans who are both old and young at the present, rather than 
leaving younger people to make all of the sacrifices needed to keep Social Security 
stable.  A COLA reduction also represents a decrease in future Social Security benefit 
growth, so as to avoid the disincentive effects to working and saving that may 
accompany additional Social Security payroll tax increases.  On the other hand, COLA 
reductions produce the largest relative impacts on the incomes of the poor, who rely 
more on Social Security benefits.  The compounding effects of the COLA reduction 
also create the unique characteristic of transferring income from those who live the 
longest to those who die shortly after retirement, and it is the extreme elderly who may 
be least able to afford this change.  Thus, while I see much merit in COLA reductions 
as an avenue for reform, it is important to understand the effects of such a reform on 
the income distribution of the elderly.  By testing a number of modified COLA 
reduction plans, I find that a reform plan incorporating COLA reductions could easily    3  
be modified to alleviate the burden on the poor while also funding a significant portion 
of the expected Trust Fund imbalance.   
I seek to address a number of different questions regarding the viability of a 
COLA reduction.  Who would lose benefits with a COLA reduction and by how 
much?  Would the COLA reduction cause too much financial hardship for some 
segments of the population?  How would a COLA reduction affect the income 
distribution in the United States?  How could different modifications to the COLA 
reduction plan, such as a proposal that would apply the COLA reduction only to 
certain age ranges, affect the financial situation of different retirees?  What role would 
the Supplemental Security Income program play in offsetting newly created financial 
hardships?  How much costlier would these modifications be from the perspective of 
the Social Security Trust Fund?  Finally, how do the potential savings to the Trust 
Fund from the COLA reduction compare to the addition to the poverty gap, which is 
the dollar amount required to ensure that everyone has an income at least equal to their 
poverty threshold?  Briefly, I find that while the COLA reductions do create quite 
noticeable increases in the poverty rates of the elderly, the savings that a COLA 
reduction creates for the Trust Fund dwarf the increase in the poverty gap.  Thus, a 
COLA reduction accompanied by an expansion of the Supplemental Security Income 
program or some other procedure could alleviate a significant portion of the foreseen 
gap in the Trust Fund without creating additional poverty. 
The paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 provides more detail about the 
cost-of-living adjustment and the controversy about its role in Social Security benefit 
calculations.  Section 3 explains the methodology.  Section 4 follows with the results,    4  
which include quantifying the benefit loss and change in poverty status created by 
different COLA reduction plans, and measuring the overall effects of the COLA 
reduction on the poverty gap, the Supplemental Security Income program, and the 
Social Security Trust Fund.  Finally, I conclude with a summary and policy 
recommendations. 
 
2   Background on the Cost-of-Living Adjustment 
Automatic Social Security COLAs became law in the early 1970s in order to 
keep real benefits constant during a time of rapid and variable inflation.  Prior to 1972, 
benefit increases were occasional and intermittent.  Under the current benefit 
formulation, workers collecting retiree benefits see COLAs starting at age 62, 
regardless of their actual age of initial benefit receipt.  Subsequent benefits grow each 
year at the rate of the Consumer Price Index for Urban and Clerical Workers (CPI-W).  
However, a number of researchers argue that the CPI overstates the true level of rising 
prices.  In 1996, the Advisory Commission to Study the Consumer Price Index 
published a report in which their best estimate was that the CPI overstated the true 
cost-of-living by 1.1 percent points annually (the range of this estimate was 0.8 to 1.6 
percentage points), on account of familiar reasons such as the substitution bias, the 
outlet bias, the quality change bias, and the new product bias.  In response, the CPI 
calculation methodology has been adjusted to decrease annual levels by about 0.6 
percentage points.      5  
The Boskin Commission helped provide justification to those who sought 
decreases in the cost-of-living adjustments as a way to keep the Social Security Trust 
Fund solvent over the long-term horizon.  Johnson (1999b) provides an interesting 
discussion of the numerous bills introduced to Congress during the 1990s which called 
for a reduction in COLAs.  The baseline modification to the COLA that the Social 
Security Administration (SSA) considers is to use a COLA of the CPI-W less one 
percentage point (but not less than zero).  The SSA finds that such a reform could be 
expected to close about 73% of the Trust Fund deficit foreseen in the 75 year horizon.  
In addition to this baseline, in this paper I will also consider COLA reductions that 
apply to a shortened span of ages: 62 to 75, 62 to 80, and 62 to 85.   
COLA reductions are not without opposition, though, and while a COLA 
reduction had been discussed for possible inclusion in the 2001 Report of the 
President’s Commission to Strengthen Social Security, it did not appear in the 
published draft.  Instead, the President’s Commission plan includes price indexing 
(instead of wage indexing) as the way to reduce the burden on the Trust Fund.  Price 
indexing is a plan that does not affect the current elderly.  However, the younger one 
is, the lower one’s benefits will someday be (Pfau (2003a)).
1  The case made against 
COLA reduction by the Senior Citizens League is that, in fact, the CPI-W understates, 
rather than overstates, the actual price growth faced by retirees.  Essentially, health 
care and prescription costs play a larger role in senior spending than in the general 
market basket of goods used for the CPI-W, and the prices of these goods and services 
grow at faster rates.      6  
Instead, the Senior Citizens League advocates the use of an experimental 
Consumer Price Index for Elderly Consumers (CPI-E) to be used for benefit 
adjustments.  Amble and Stewart (1994) provide further detail on this CPI-E, showing 
how medical care prices doubled between 1982 and 1992, which is a price growth that 
is twice as fast as other items in the market basket of goods.  Meanwhile, in 1987, the 
weight of medical care in the CPI-W was 4.95%, while its weight in the CPI-E was 
9.47%.  For the period from 1988 to 1993, this contributed to the CPI-E growing on 
average by 0.43 percentage points faster per year than the CPI-W.  Motivated by this 
matter, these senior groups argue that a COLA reduction would be counter-productive 
to the goal of maintaining the real value of benefits for the elderly.   
Steurle et al. (1999) also question the efficacy of a COLA reduction on account 
that it will provide young retirees with a false sense of security.  Many new retirees 
may not realize that their benefits will not continue to grow with the rate of wages in 
the economy, or even with the general inflation rate, and so they will be less prepared 
to meet the financial costs of extremely old age.  This is a particularly poignant 
observation about a plan that would maintain the benefits of young retirees while 
decreasing the growth of benefits at later ages. 
 
3   Methodology 
The March 2000 Current Population Survey (CPS) of the Census Bureau will 
be used as a basis for considering a number of important questions about the viability 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
1Mulligan and Sala-i-Martin (1999) explain the political success of advocacy groups 
for the elderly.    7  
of reforms that would alter the cost-of-living adjustments made annually to Social 
Security benefits.  It contains data on a number of sources of income for survey 
participants, as well as information about household and family relations.  As is 
consistent with the existing literature, such as Social Security Administration (2000b) 
and Johnson (1999a and 1999b), my analysis will be made in terms of “aged units.”  
Aged units are defined in this paper as any nonmarried persons aged 65 or older, or 
any married couples in which at least one of the spouses is aged 65 or older.  For 
married couples, the incomes are combined and assigned to the male whenever he is at 
least 65, or to the female when the male spouse is under 65.  Persons who are married, 
but whom the CPS identifies as separated from their spouse, are considered to be 
nonmarried, as is done in Social Security Administration (2000b).  There are 12,262 
aged units in this sample.  These include 5,097 married couples, 1,796 unmarried 
males, and 5,369 unmarried females.  Alternatively, 6,388 of the aged units are 
between 65 and 74, while 4,487 are between 75 and 84, and 1,387 are 85 and older. 
The method of this paper follows the approach of Johnson (1999a and 1999b) 
in that I compare the Social Security benefits for aged units to the hypothetical 
benefits that these aged units would have received had a COLA reduction been 
enacted a pre-defined number of years ago.  This approach assumes that everything 
other than Social Security benefits remains the same.  In other words, the aged units 
do not alter their behavioral responses to the potential loss of Social Security benefits, 
and there are otherwise no macroeconomic feedbacks to the policy change.  If the 
COLA reduction had passed 10 years ago, then an aged unit of any age would have 
had at most 10 years worth of COLA reductions.  Many of the tables show a COLA    8  
reduction plan that passed 60 years ago.  This length of time is only meant to indicate 
that the COLA reduction had been passed long enough ago that aged units of all ages 
received reduced COLAs for the maximum possible number of years.  This method 
allows for a comparison of the benefits and incomes of aged units found in the CPS 
sample to those after the simulated COLA reduction.   
Ages in the Current Population Survey are topcoded at 90, which poses a 
problem for understanding the effects of COLA adjustments on the oldest members of 
the population.  To deal with this problem, I use the Social Security’s life expectancy 
tables (Bell (1997)) to impute an actual age for anyone aged 90 in the CPS.  
Unfortunately, this approach does not allow for income levels to be assigned in a way 
that would follow any age patterns beyond the age of 90.  Nonetheless, applying 
subsequent mortality rates to those listed as 90 allows for a more realistic distribution 
of ages beyond 90, with a few individuals living even beyond the age of 105. 
 
4   Results for the COLA Reduction Proposals 
The results are divided into several sub-sections.  First, I consider the 
economic resources available to the aged units in the March 2000 CPS.  Then I 
quantify the loss of projected benefit growth that would be caused by the various 
COLA reduction plans.  This is followed by a consideration of the COLA reductions’ 
impacts on poverty rates, the poverty gap, and the SSI program.  The section 
concludes with estimates of the savings these COLA reduction plans would provide    9  
for the Social Security Trust Fund, and whether the various COLA reduction plans 
would present a sustainable solvency solution for Social Security. 
4.1   Measuring the Economic Resources of the Elderly  
The income of aged units consists of all their money income, before any 
deductions for taxes, union dues, or Medicare premiums.  Following the approach of 
the Social Security Administration (2000b), sources of income include wages and 
salaries, self-employment income (including losses), Social Security, Supplemental 
Security Income, public assistance, interest, dividends, rent, royalties, estates or trusts, 
veterans’ payments, unemployment and workers’ compensation, private and 
government retirement and disability pensions, alimony, child support, and any other 
source of income that was regularly received.  It does not include nonmoney transfers 
such as food stamps, subsidized housing, payments-in-kind, health benefits, or other 
fringe benefits.   
Figure 1 illustrates the sources of income for the elderly by income deciles, 
both in terms of the relative percentage of income and the average income amount.  
Sources of income are divided into five categories: Social Security benefits, pensions, 
assets, earnings, and other.  The pensions category includes retirement and survivor 
benefits from sources other than Social Security.  Assets include the income from 
interest, dividends, and rents.  Earnings include wages and salary or self-employment 
income.  The remaining “other” income is the total income of the aged unit less the 
previously mentioned categories.  The figure demonstrates a number of important 
details which help explain the effects of COLA reductions.  Over 80% of the 
retirement income of the bottom three income deciles comes from Social Security    10  
benefits.  For higher income deciles, the importance of benefits gradually erodes as 
other sources of income begin to dominate.   
Another feature is that the “other” category of income accounts for more than 
15% of the income in the bottom decile, but then is gradually diminished in 
importance at higher income deciles.  This trend is explained by Supplemental 
Security Income (SSI), a program which provides a guaranteed income to enrollees 
aged 65 and over, amongst others, with sufficiently low income and assets.  It is 
funded from general government revenues.  SSI income guarantees are below the 
poverty threshold, and McGarry (2000) finds that the uptake rates of those eligible for 
SSI are only between 50 and 60%.   
Some characteristics of the SSI program observed in the March 2000 CPS 
include that only 4.6% of aged units receive income from SSI, but that SSI benefits 
account for 46% of the total money income for those who receive it.  In making 
McGarry’s observation more clear, the mean income from the bottom income decile of 
aged units is only $3,939, but only 16.9% of aged units in the bottom income decile 
receive SSI income.  For those in the bottom income decile who do receive SSI, the 
SSI benefits account for 61.5% of their income.  While researchers have not provided 
a conclusive explanation for why SSI uptake rates are so low, it is inevitable that a 
portion of the income offsets created by the COLA reductions would be covered 
through increased usage of the SSI program.  However, given present uptake rates, 
one should not be too reliant on SSI as a means of counteracting the negative income 
effects of a COLA reduction on the most vulnerable members of the elderly 
population.  Section 4.5 will provide estimates of the likely additional SSI uptake.     11  
With this picture of income resources for the aged units, the stage has been set to 
consider how COLA reductions will affect the benefits and incomes of the elderly 
population. 
4.2   Quantifying the Benefit Loss for Individuals  
This section examines the effects of four different COLA reduction plans on 
the level of presently legislated benefits and total income.  All plans consider a one 
percentage point reduction in the cost-of-living adjustment per year.  The difference 
between the plans is the age span to which the COLA reduction is applied.  In the 
baseline case, the COLA reduction is applied to all ages beyond 62.  Other plans apply 
the COLA reduction to ages 62-75, ages 62-80, and ages 62-85.  Figures 2 to 5 
quantify the general nature of benefit loss by age that can be expected from the COLA 
reduction plans.  Tables 1 to 3 apply these results to the Current Population Survey to 
see the overall impacts of the benefit reduction on an actual sample of workers with 
realistic age and income distributions. 
Figures 2 and 3 indicate the reductions from presently-legislated benefit levels 
for a number of different assumed inflation rates ranging from 0% to 20% per year, 
assuming that the COLA reduction was enacted either 20 or 60 years ago.  Benefits 
would continue to grow with the COLA, though just not as quickly as before.  Because 
the law would prevent COLA adjustments from falling below zero, a zero inflation 
rate leads to the same level of benefits regardless of the COLA reduction.  For an 
inflation rate of 0.5% per year, the new COLA after the reduction would be 0%.  This 
dampens the effect so that with the change in law made long enough in the past, a 100 
year old would see a benefit equal to about 83% of the presently legislated benefit.  At    12  
a constant 1% rate of inflation, we see the largest relative differences between the 
present law and the COLA reduction plan, as the new COLA would be 0% each year.  
If the COLA reduction had been passed 20 years ago, anyone above the age of 82 
would see benefits at about 82% of their previous level.  In this worse-case scenario of 
benefit reduction, a 95 year old who experiences a COLA reduction since the age of 
62 would have a benefit that is about 73% of the previously legislated level.  For 
inflation rates above 1%, the results become increasingly less severe, though they stay 
relatively close to those seen with the 1% level as, for instance, an annual inflation rate 
of 20% would produce an annual benefit about 85% of its previous level after twenty 
years compared to 82% for the 1% inflation rate.   
Figure 3 shows how some of these drastic effects on benefits can be lessened 
by a proposal that would only apply the COLA reduction to certain ages.  These 
graphs plot COLA reductions enacted both 20 and 60 years ago for three different sets 
of applicable ages.  A constant 1% inflation continues to represent the instance with 
the maximum percentage reduction in benefits, and when the COLA is reduced for 
ages 62-75, the benefits can fall to be at the minimum about 88% of the presently 
legislated level.  A reduced COLA applies to any given worker for at most 13 years.  
The “U” shape of the reductions for a law enacted 20 years ago result from those 
beyond the age of 82 only seeing the reduced COLA for a portion of the 20 years.  
These older workers spend a growing portion of the twenty years above the age of 75.  
After 60 years have passed since the law change, however, all workers beyond the age 
of 75 will have experienced the same drop in their COLAs for the span of ages 
between 62 and 75.  The remaining graphs of Figure 3 show the results for a COLA    13  
reduction applying to ages 62-80 and 62-85.  In these cases, with the constant 1% 
inflation scenario, benefits can fall to be about 84% and 80% of their presently 
legislated levels, respectively. 
Of course, future inflation rates will not follow the constant levels considered 
in Figures 2 and 3, and Figures 4 and 5 show the potential benefit cuts that would 
result from a series of simulations using stochastic forecasts for the future inflation 
rates.  Extensive details about the stochastic forecasting procedure are provided in 
Pfau (2003a).
2  Generally, the results of the stochastic forecasts show a lessened 
impact of the COLA reductions than seen in the previous figures.  This is because in 
most of the simulations, the economy will invariably spend a portion of time with 
inflation rates below 1%, when COLA reductions play a smaller role.  Each of these 
figures presents the median forecast, as well as the 10% and 90% quantiles.  For the 
baseline case of a COLA reduction that began long enough ago to provide the full 
effects to the population, the median forecast would lead a 70 year old to have benefits 
at about 93% of the presently legislated level, an 80 year old to have about 86%, a 90 
year old to have about 80%, and a 100 year old to have about 74% of the presently 
legislated benefit.   
Figure 5, meanwhile, shows how a modified COLA plan can mitigate the 
impacts of the baseline reform.  If the COLA reduction applies only to ages 62-75, 
                                                                 
2 Briefly, I fit a VAR model to the data for four key economic variables from 1950 to 
2000.  Each variable is constrained on average to be equal to the 2001 long-term 
projections of the SSA, so that the long-run average value of inflation is 3.3%.  With 
this model, 200 stochastic simulations are run to generate forecasts for the economic 
variables over the long-term horizon.  To create Figures 4 and 5, I use the simulations 
of inflation for the years 2030 to 2100, such that these forecasts represent the long-run 
averages and variability that we can expect for inflation.      14  
then the maximum median reduction moves to about 90%.  The median fluctuates 
somewhat because people of different ages will have experienced different COLAs for 
their years spent between the ages of 62 to 75.  Even in the worse cases, the benefit 
drop does not fall below 88% of previous levels, and in some economic simulations 
the new benefits will be around 94% of their previous levels.  For ages 62-80, those 
above the age of 80 will have benefits at around 86 to 87% of their previous level in 
the median case, and the 80% interval shows benefits ranging from between 84 and 
91% of their previous level.  Finally, for a COLA reduction applying to ages 62-85, 
the median reduction after age 85 moves benefits to about 83% of their previous 
levels, while the range of the distribution shows benefits to generally be between 80 
and 89% of the previous levels.   
Table 1 uses the sample of aged units obtained from the March 2000 CPS to 
quantify the actual benefit loss for different age groups under the different versions of 
the COLA reduction.  The average annual Social Security benefit for the aged units is 
$10,723.  Because younger retirees should have earned higher real wages on average, 
we expect them to have higher benefit levels (since initial benefits are indexed to wage 
growth).  While this is true, it is obscured in the table because the younger retirees are 
more likely still to be working and not collecting benefits.  So the average benefit for 
75 to 84 year olds exceeds that of the 65 to 74 year olds in the table.  After 20 years of 
COLA reductions, all of the aged units would experience an average loss of 10.9% of 
their presently legislated benefits, with the split between successive age groups 
growing steadily.  Those aged 65-74 would see a loss of 6.8% of their benefits, while 
those aged 75-84 experience a 14.4% drop and those above 85 experience a 17.4%    15  
drop.  A modified COLA reduction would mitigate the loss in benefits, particularly for 
those aged above 85 years old.  If the COLA reductions stopped at age 75, this oldest 
age group experiences a 6.4% drop, while a COLA reduction to age 85 would lead to 
benefit losses of 14.5%.  Finally, after 60 years of COLA reductions, those aged 85 
and older would experience a 22% drop from the present law benefit level in the 
baseline case.  Stopping the COLA reductions at age 75 would lead to their benefit 
loss equaling 11.5% instead, while stopping at age 80 and 85 would lead to drops of 
15.6% and 19.4%, respectively. 
Table 2 extends beyond the benefit loss for the aged units to demonstrate how 
COLA reductions would affect the total income of the aged units across the income 
distribution.  The implication here is that because Social Security benefits play a more 
significant role in the incomes of the poor, a loss of part of these benefits means losing 
a larger portion of one’s income.  The picture presented in Table 2 is that the bottom 
three income deciles will tend to lose about 10% of their potential income with the 
various COLA reduction plans, and that even a COLA reduction applying only to ages 
62-75 would still remove about 8% of the potential income for these groups.  
Specifically, after 60 years of COLA reduction, the bottom decile would have incomes 
that are 10.2% less than otherwise, while the second and third deciles see incomes 
which are 11.5 and 11.6% less than otherwise.  Then the effects on income diminish 
gradually, as the fourth decile sees incomes that are 9.7% less, while the richest decile 
in the economy experiences an income drop of only 1.2%.
3  Considering a COLA 
                                                                 
3 Table 2 results do not consider the role that Supplemental Security Income would 
play in restoring some of the income loss for the bottom deciles, who could potentially 
become eligible for SSI benefits.  See Section 4.5.    16  
reduction for ages 62-75, the effects on total income are somewhat diminished.  After 
60 years of the law change, the bottom decile would lose 7.7% of their income, and 
this number would increase to 8.6% for the third decile and decrease after that so that 
the tenth decile loses 1% of their income.  One can see from the continuation of Table 
2 that COLA reductions lasting for ages 62-80 and 62-85 would lead to income losses 
which are in between the baseline case and the 62-75 case.   
Table 3 repeats the analysis of Table 2, but instead focuses on the income 
distribution for those aged 85 and older, which is the group most vulnerable to the 
compounding effects of a COLA reduction plan.  For this age group, with the baseline 
COLA reduction enacted long enough ago, the bottom income decile would lose 
18.7% of their potential income in 1999, while the second to fifth deciles would all 
lose over 20% of their income.  Such a result will likely be unacceptable for most 
policy makers.  Some of these effects can be lessened by considering a COLA 
reduction applying to ages 62 to 75.  Now the bottom income decile risks losing 9.4% 
of their potential income, while the second to fifth deciles will lose between 9.9 and 
10.4% of their incomes.  Essentially, the impact on the income of the oldest age group 
is cut in half.  Meanwhile, the effects of the COLA reductions for ages 62-80 and 62-
85 are seen to fall in the interval between the previous two plans.  In both cases, the 
peak income loss occurs for the second income decile, and these losses are 14.2% and 
17.8%, respectively.  With such large and nontrivial impacts on income, the next 
important question to consider is the role that these COLA reduction plans would play 
in pushing the elderly population towards poverty.  In other words, could the elderly 
population be expected to maintain a suitable lifestyle with this loss of income?    17  
4.3   Effects on Poverty Status 
Poverty thresholds in the United States are calculated using several factors: the 
number of people in the household and the portion of these who are children under 18 
years old, and for family units of size one or two, whether the householder of the 
family is 65 and older.
4  Income used to determine poverty status is the same as the 
income calculated for the aged units.  However, because the definition of aged units in 
this paper excludes members of the family or household aside from spouses, the 
poverty threshold I use may also differ from the official CPS amount.  In 1999, the 
relevant year for the March 2000 CPS, the poverty threshold for one person aged 65 or 
older was $7,990, while that for a married couple with the householder aged 65 or 
older was $10,075.  Since I do not include the incomes of other potential family 
members, the poverty thresholds used here consist of one of the two above values.  
Table 4 presents the imputed or “unofficial” poverty thresholds as compared to the 
values found in the CPS.  My imputation matches the CPS for 72% of the aged units 
that I define as nonmarried.  In the remaining 28% of cases, the CPS considers these 
aged units to be a part of some larger family structure that may be able to share 
economic resources with one another.  As for the aged units that I treat as married 
couples, 84.8% of this sample does actually live in a two-person married household.
5  
                                                                 
4 For additional information on poverty thresholds, see the General Accounting Office 
(2001), Social Security Administration Office of Policy (2000), Deaton and Paxson 
(1995), or http://www.census.gov/hhes/poverty/threshld/thresh99.html. 
5 The CPS assigned to 6.4% of the married couples the poverty rate for those below 
the age of 65 because of differences in how an aged unit is defined.  In this research, if 
a husband is under 65, but is the head of the household and has a spouse older than 65, 
then I assign the poverty rate for elderly couples to this unit, while the Census Bureau 
would treat this unit as under the age of 65.    18  
The CPS recognizes that the remaining 15.2% of this sample are actually part of a 
larger family structure.  Some of these units may have access to a wider variety of 
shared income resources (such as the incomes of adult children), while others may 
have young children who need to share their parents’ economic resources.  Since I 
only consider the income of members of the aged unit, it is reasonable to reassign 
poverty thresholds that are applicable to these specific units, rather than using the 
larger thresholds that assume a possibility of income derived from other family 
members too.  These measures present, to some degree, the possibilities of self-
sufficiency for the aged units. 
  Table 5 uses all of the aged units as the base sample to examine poverty rates.  
There are 25.2 million aged units in the population, and their poverty rate is 15.9%.  If 
a COLA reduction had been enacted 60 years ago, so that all Social Security 
beneficiaries would have experienced COLA reductions for all ages since they turned 
62, the poverty rate would have been increased by 4.6 percentage points to 20.5%.  
COLA reduction plans that apply for a smaller age range do not show the poverty rates 
to be alleviated much, as a COLA reduction applying only to ages 62 to 75 would still 
have lead to a 19% poverty rate.   
Looking further down Table 5, older people generally experience higher 
poverty rates than younger people, single people experience higher poverty rates than 
married couples, and women experience higher poverty rates than men.  A COLA 
reduction 60 years ago would increase poverty rates for those aged 65-74 by 1.9 
percentage points from 14.6% to 16.5%, while those aged 85 and older would see their 
poverty rates increase from 22.4% to 36.9%, a jump of 14.5 percentage points.     19  
Meanwhile, married couples experience the lowest poverty rates.  They range between 
4% and 5% across the age ranges, though a COLA reduction would increase poverty 
for the oldest married couples by the most.  It is the unmarried females who 
experience the highest poverty rates.  Unmarried females aged 85 and older have a 
poverty rate of 29.1% at present.  A COLA reduction would increase this poverty rate 
to 47.3%, while a COLA reduction applying only to ages 62-75 would increase this 
poverty rate to 37.2%.  Table 5 indicates that a COLA reduction will have significant 
effects on the poverty rates experienced by the elderly populations, and that these 
effects vary by age, gender, and marital status.   
Table 6 considers the 90% of the aged units in the sample that actually receive 
Social Security benefits, and thus is more relevant for the purposes of understanding 
the COLA reduction.  This table should show larger differences between the poverty 
rates before and after COLA reductions since it no longer contains the 10% of the 
sample whose incomes are not affected by the COLA reductions.  However, whether 
poverty rates should be higher or lower in this table is less clear, as the whole sample 
would show higher poverty rates to the extent that some elderly people with higher 
incomes are still working and have not begun their benefit receipt, while the whole 
sample could show lower poverty rates as some elderly individuals in the sample do 
not have any sources of income and appear to be wholly dependent on other people.   
Table 6 does show lower poverty rates than Table 5, as the actual poverty rate 
for the aged units receiving benefits is 13.1% instead of 15.9%.  With the baseline 
COLA reduction for ages beyond 62, the poverty rates increases to 18.2%, whereas it 
had been 20.5% in Table 5.  Meanwhile, a COLA reduction for ages 62-75 would    20  
create a poverty rate of 16.5%, compared to 19% before.  These trends of lower 
poverty rates are seen repeatedly in Table 6 with the various subgroups of the sample.  
Nonetheless, while poverty rates in Table 6 have been decreased, it is still the case that 
COLA reductions will lead to significant jumps in the poverty rates for the oldest 
members of the population, even when the COLA reduction is modified to apply only 
to ages 62 to 75. 
4.4   Costs of Counteracting Poverty Status 
Though it was shown in Section 4.3 that a COLA reduction can create rather 
significant increases on the poverty rates of the elderly population, comparing incomes 
to a poverty rate is somewhat arbitrary, as a higher poverty rate does not indicate how 
much income is being lost.  This section examines the poverty situation in more detail 
through use of the poverty gap, which is defined in McGarry (2000) as a measure of 
the total dollar amount needed to raise all incomes to the poverty line.  In this section, 
I seek to determine the cost of having all aged units receive a minimum income equal 
to the poverty threshold in light of the COLA reductions.   
The details are found in Table 7.  In the 2000 March CPS, the poverty gap of 
the aged units was equal to $11.8 billion, meaning that this is the amount of money 
that would be needed to raise the incomes of all aged units to at least the poverty level.  
The baseline COLA reduction plan enacted 60 years ago would increase the value of 
the poverty gap to $15.8 billion, which represents an additional 33.5% growth in the 
poverty gap.  If the COLA reduction applied to ages 62 to 75, then the poverty gap 
would instead be $14.2 billion, which represents 20% growth from the present.  The 
poverty gaps existing with the 62-80 and 62-85 COLA reduction plans are $14.9 and    21  
$15.3 billion.  The poverty gap would grow by $2.4 billion with the 62-75 plan, then it 
would grow an additional $700 million to switch to 62-80, then it would grow an 
additional $400 million to get to the 62-85 range, and finally it would rise an 
additional $500 million to apply the COLA reduction to all ages above 62.  If one 
wanted to close the poverty gap after passing the baseline COLA reduction plan, the 
cost would have been approximately $15.8 billion to remove all aged units from 
poverty.  In Section 4.6, I compare this amount to how much would be saved in 
reduced Social Security benefit payments. 
4.5   Effects on Supplemental Security Income 
Some of the poverty relief for the lower benefits accompanying the COLA 
reductions would come automatically from the expansion of the Supplemental 
Security Income program.  However, estimating this effect is not entirely 
straightforward, as only slightly more than half of those eligible for SSI benefits 
actually receive them.  This section provides estimates of SSI’s impact on 
counteracting the benefit loss resulting from the COLA reductions.  An established 
literature exists on the factors affecting the participation of the elderly in the SSI 
program.  Factors may include a stigma associated with accepting benefits, a lack of 
knowledge about how to apply for benefits, an inability to apply for benefits due to 
health or other logistical reasons, or a simple assessment that the effort needed to 
apply for benefits is too great.  The conclusion of McCarry (2000) is that benefit 
uptake is strongly related to financial need, as those who would expect to receive the 
largest SSI benefits are most likely to apply.  If this is the case, then the loss of Social 
Security benefits from the COLA reduction has implications for the SSI program.     22  
Those who already receive SSI benefits may be eligible for larger benefits after the 
COLA reduction.  In addition, those who were eligible or become newly eligible will 
be more likely to apply for their SSI benefits.  In this section, I find support for the 
McCarry conclusion that SSI benefit uptake is strongly related to financial need.  I 
also find that the full COLA reduction would be expected to raise the federal SSI 
payments by about 8.7% from their current levels.   
To obtain these estimates, the federal government’s income criteria for SSI 
eligibility are applied to the sample of aged units.  To determine eligibility for federal 
SSI benefits, one calculates the SSI countable income.  Countable income is total 
income less income disregards, which include the first $20 of unearned income each 
month, the first $65 of earned income each month, and half of any earned income 
above $65 per month.  Because the CPS provides annual data, I assume that monthly 
income was divided equally across the months.
6  In the sample, 10,743 units were 
found to be ineligible and not receiving SSI, 187 were ineligible but were receiving 
SSI, 925 were eligible but not receiving SSI, and 407 were eligible and receiving SSI.   
Table 8 provides the summary statistics for these four groups.  Those not 
eligible and not participating are the wealthiest among the groups, since it is their 
larger incomes that make them ineligible.  The average income in this group is 3.54 
times the poverty level.  A more troubling group are those who are not eligible for SSI 
benefits and yet receive them, despite the incomes for those in this group being 
substantially higher than those who are determined to be eligible.  Several factors can 
                                                                 
6 An asset test is also applied by the SSA, and those with countable assets above 
$2,000 for singles or $3,000 for couples become ineligible for SSI.  Because the CPS 
does not provide income on total assets, the asset test is disregarded.      23  
help explain this situation.  States are allowed to supplement the SSI income and to 
also create additional benefits for those who are disabled or have other impairments, 
for which the federal eligibility requirements do not account.  The CPS does not have 
sufficient information on health and living situations to identify who would be eligible 
for these supplemental benefits.  Evidence that this fact accounts for some of these 187 
aged units includes that this group has the largest average maximum possible state 
supplemental benefit and also the largest rate of disability.  However, this does not 
account for all cases.  Another possible explanation is that the annual income data 
masks monthly income variation which may have allowed some aged units to receive 
SSI for part of the year.  It also seems that the CPS data includes some errors in SSI 
benefit receipt.  Ten members of this group receive SSI benefits over $10,000, which 
is not realistic.   
As for those who are eligible for SSI benefits, Table 8 shows some substantial 
differences between the two groups.  Those eligible and not participating generally 
have a stronger economic position than those who do participate.  Their countable 
incomes for determining SSI benefits are $3,178 on average compared to $2,428 for 
those who do receive benefits.  This translates into an average calculated federal 
benefit of $3,212, which is less than the calculated benefit of $3,930 for those 
receiving SSI.  Those who apply for benefits also live in more generous states on 
average, and they are more likely to be disabled.  Table 8 provides support for 
McCarry’s conclusion that it is the size of potential benefits that will most influence 
whether they are received.    24  
Table 9 presents the results of the probit estimation.  The dependent variable is 
whether one receives SSI benefits, and the estimation sample consists of those whom I 
determined to be eligible for federal SSI benefits.  This analysis finds that the 
calculated federal SSI benefit is significant, though its impact is small.  An increase in 
the benefit of $100 per year would only be expected to increase the probability of 
applying by about 0.3%.  Other significant dependent variables include disability 
status (being disabled increases the probability by 26.7%), the generosity of the state 
(if the maximum allowable benefit offered by the state is $100 larger, then the 
probability of uptake increases by 4.2%), and whether the aged units receive an 
income from their asset holdings (having asset income reduces the probability of 
uptake by 16%).  However, for asset holdings the significance of the coefficient may 
result from the fact that those receiving large income from their assets may have 
actually failed the federal asset test.  This is supported by an additional test.  I assume 
that assets earned a 6% return, so that total asset holdings are (100/6) of the asset 
income, and then apply the asset test to this hypothetical amount.  The hypothetical 
asset test reduces those who are eligible for SSI from 1,332 to 1,194 and the 
significance of holding assets disappears.  Of course, this asset calculation is quite 
unreliable and so it is not otherwise used in the paper.  Though not statistically 
significant, other results from the probit include that older aged units are less likely to 
apply for SSI, that females are more likely to apply, that married couples are more 
likely to apply, and that those who are receiving Social Security benefits are more 
likely to apply.    25  
Using these probit estimates, Table 10 begins to explore the question of how 
the COLA reduction plans would interact with the SSI program.  Table 10 considers a 
one percentage point COLA reduction enacted 60 years ago.  The sample of aged units 
is divided into five parts.  First are those who receive SSI benefits even though they 
were found to be ineligible.  Despite not having been included in the probit sample, 
this group demonstrates the second largest probabilities of benefit uptake.  In large 
part this is because the group had the highest disability rates and the highest levels of 
state generosity.  Of the 187 members of this group, the COLA reduction made 60 of 
them eligible for benefits after the change, and the average federal SSI eligibility 
became $192.  In many cases these aged units were probably eligible for the more 
generous benefit offerings of their states.  The second group is those not eligible for 
benefits and not receiving benefits.  This group contained those with the highest 
incomes, the highest percentage of males, and the highest percentage of married 
couples.  The probit model indicates that those in this group had a 13.62% probability 
of benefit uptake, though of course they were prohibited from doing so because they 
did not meet the eligibility requirements.  The third group includes those not receiving 
benefits, but who were otherwise eligible.  For this group, the COLA reduction 
increased the calculated federal benefit from $3,212 to $3,546 on average, and the 
probability of uptake increased from 24.94% to 25.74%.  This increase in probability 
is small because the probit found that the impact of larger benefits is small.  The fourth 
group, with 396 members, is those not receiving SSI benefits and who were not 
eligible before the COLA reduction, but become eligible for SSI after the COLA 
reduction.  This group has more income than the other eligible groups on account of    26  
having just crossed over the eligibility threshold after the COLA reduction.  Countable 
incomes for this group dropped from $7,017 to $5,781, and the average benefit 
eligibility for this group increased to $530.  Given the characteristics of those in this 
group, the probit indicates that these newly eligible aged units will have a probability 
of 23.48% on average to accept their SSI benefits.  Finally, the fifth group is eligible 
for SSI and receives benefits.  For this group, the COLA reduction increases the 
average calculated federal benefit eligibility from $3,930 to $4,210.  The probit 
indicates that members of this group should have had a 42.8% probability of accepting 
their SSI benefits. 
Table 11 provides the estimates of the monetary impact of the COLA reduction 
on the federal SSI program.  The estimates are devised by considering the changes for 
five different subgroups of the aged units sample.  For those who were deemed to be 
ineligible for benefits but received them nonetheless, the benefit levels are kept the 
same after the COLA reduction.  However, for the portion of this group that did 
become eligible after the COLA reduction, their new federal benefits were included.  
On the other hand, no benefits were provided to those who were not already receiving 
them and who are still ineligible even after the COLA reduction.  The third group 
represents those who were initially eligible for benefits, but who did not apply to 
receive them.  The benefit estimates for this group were determined by multiplying the 
calculated difference in probability of uptake before and after the COLA reduction by 
the calculated federal benefit eligibility.  The fourth group represents those not 
receiving SSI benefits and who only become eligible for benefits after the COLA 
reduction.  For this group, the calculated federal SSI benefit is multiplied by the    27  
estimated probability of benefit uptake after the COLA reduction.  Finally, the fifth 
group represents those who were eligible for benefits initially and who were also 
receiving them.  For this group, the estimated new SSI benefit was calculated by 
adding the difference in their eligible federal benefit before and after the COLA 
reduction to the SSI benefit they were initially receiving. 
The first part of Table 11 shows the results for the baseline COLA reduction 
enacted 60 years ago.  I find that the COLA reduction would increase the costs for the 
federal SSI program by approximately $437 million, or 8.7%.  The largest portion of 
these additional costs comes from the additional payments made to those already 
receiving SSI to offset the loss of income created by the COLA reduction.  This 
represents about $230 million of the change.  In addition, the 784,000 who would 
become eligible after the COLA reduction are estimated to receive $100 million in SSI 
benefits assuming that their uptake rate is 23.5%.  An additional $76 million would go 
to those who were already receiving SSI benefits, but who only became eligible for 
federal benefits after the COLA reduction.  Comparing this result to Table 7, we see 
that the SSI program would account for about one-tenth of the $4 billion increase in 
the poverty gap created by the COLA reduction.  Meanwhile, part (b) of Table 11 
shows that for a COLA Reduction applying to ages 62 to 75, the additional costs is 
calculated to be $290 million, which represents over one-tenth of the $2.4 billion 
increase in the poverty gap.  For the other two COLA reductions, the increase in SSI 
federal benefit payments is found to be $359 million and $401 million, respectively.  
While the SSI program can be expected to counteract some of the effects of the COLA    28  
reduction, policy makers should not be overly reliant on the program since so many of 
the eligible SSI beneficiaries do not apply to receive their benefits. 
4.6   Effects on the Trust Fund 
If the effects of the COLA reduction plan on the Trust Fund are larger than the 
additional poverty gap created, then it may be possible for policy makers to improve 
the status of the Trust Fund without pushing the elderly into further poverty.  This 
situation is addressed in Table 12, which considers the effects of the COLA reduction 
plans on the Trust Fund.  The numbers presented in this section are meant to serve 
only as a rough estimate created by a static analysis of one year, rather than tracking 
the dynamic evolution of the Trust Fund.  In 2003, the Social Security 
Administration’s best guess about the future is that the Social Security Trust Fund 
would be depleted by 2042.  I use as a starting point the estimate by the Social 
Security Administration, reported in Koitz et al. (2001), that the baseline COLA 
reduction plan applying to all ages beyond 62 would eliminate 73% of the 75 year 
actuarial deficit forecasted by the Social Security Administration.  The estimates for 
the other COLA reduction plans provided in Table 8 are calculated by adding the 
Social Security benefit payments to all aged units and comparing them to the baseline 
case.  For the COLA reduction applying only to ages 62 to 75, one could still expect 
that approximately 58% of the Trust Fund deficit could be closed, compared to the 
73% of the baseline COLA reduction.  Additionally, the COLA reduction applying to 
ages 62 to 80 could be expected to close about 67% of the Trust Fund gap, and the 
reduction for ages 62 to 85 would close 71% of the gap.  These numbers are all 
relatively close to the baseline COLA reduction since the size of the population at the    29  
higher age groups diminishes rapidly.  In other words, there are relatively few people 
above the age of 85, so that providing them with higher benefits will not have a very 
large impact on the Trust Fund.  This result should provide some reassurance to the 
idea that if Congress were to pass a COLA reduction for a limited set of ages, a large 
portion of the expected shortfall for the Trust Fund can still be closed. 
Comparisons of the Trust Fund savings to the increase in the poverty gap are 
also quite favorable.  Once the COLA reduction has been in place long enough that all 
retirees are affected, the savings to the Trust Fund of the baseline COLA reduction 
plan are $31.2 billion.  This amount is compared to an addition to the poverty gap of 
$4 billion, or a total existing poverty gap of $15.8 billion.  As seen here, a COLA 
reduction could be used to shore up the entire poverty gap and still contribute a 
significant amount to the long run solvency of the Trust Fund.  The same analysis also 
applies to the other COLA reduction plans.  For instance, the COLA reduction 
applying to ages 62 to 75 would save the Trust Fund an additional $24.9 billion, while 
only increasing the poverty gap an additional $2.4 billion.  These results should 
alleviate the concerns that the COLA reduction would push the most vulnerable 
groups of the elderly into extreme poverty, as the COLA reduction could be combined 
with some other measures to provide relief both to the existing poverty among the 
elderly and also to the future deficits foreseen for the Trust Fund. 
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5   Summary and Conclusions 
In comparison to other potential reforms, a reduction in the cost-of-living 
adjustment will create particular winners and losers.  Decreasing the COLA allows for 
the impact of reform to be shared more equally across generations, though it risks 
pushing the poorest and the oldest into more extreme poverty.  COLA reductions can 
be expected to have regressive effects on incomes because of two basic facts: poor 
elderly people receive a larger proportion of their incomes in the form of Social 
Security benefits, and higher ages are generally correlated both with lower incomes 
and larger impacts from the compounding effects of COLA reductions.  The least 
appealing aspect of the COLA reduction plans most frequently considered are that the 
compounding effects of the reductions would create the largest benefit losses for the 
extreme elderly, who may be the group least prepared to forego a rather sizeable 
portion of their income.  In this paper I explore modified COLA reduction plans that 
only apply to certain age groups, in order to study whether a modified version of the 
COLA reduction plan could keep the appealing aspects of COLA reductions, while 
relieving its most unattractive aspects.  Though the results found herein could be 
debated by policy makers, I believe that this work has been a success.  
At first, the outlook for COLA reductions seems somewhat bleak.  This paper 
demonstrated that the COLA reduction plans will substantially diminish the incomes 
of the poor.  A COLA reduction plan could be expected to reduce the Social Security 
benefits of those aged 65 to 74 by about 7% on average, while those aged 75 to 84 will 
lose close to 15% of their benefits on average, and those aged 85 and older will lose    31  
22% of their benefits on average.  This benefit loss translates into income loss as well, 
as with the baseline COLA reduction plan the incomes of the bottom part of the 
income distribution can fall by over 10%.  Modified COLA reduction plans could 
alleviate this situation somewhat, though even a COLA reduction plan applying only 
to ages 62 to 75 would still reduce the incomes of the bottom part of the income 
distribution by over 8%. 
Nevertheless, while this situation seems rather bleak, the results appear much 
more promising when comparing the savings that the COLA reduction would bring to 
the Trust Fund to the growth in the poverty gap caused by the reductions.  The 
hypothetical baseline COLA reduction passed long enough ago added $4 billion to the 
poverty gap in 1999, but saved the Trust Fund $31.2 billion from the smaller benefit 
payment obligations.  This result provides ample ground for fashioning a COLA 
reduction plan with income guarantees to the poorest beneficiaries that will still help 
to contribute to a much stronger situation for the Social Security Trust Fund.  Though 
the President’s Commission (2001) report uses price indexing as the tool for reducing 
the future obligations of the Social Security Trust Fund, the results of this paper 
should hopefully persuade policy makers not to ignore the possibilities of COLA 
reductions.  Senior citizen advocacy groups are concerned that COLA reductions will 
force the elderly population to choose between food and health care, but this does not 
have to be the case. 
There are still many areas in which this research could be expanded.  First, this 
analysis could be applied to entire families, rather than just the aged units.  This would 
demonstrate the effects of including the income of adult children and others who may    32  
live with the aged units.  It would have mixed effects on the poverty levels, as some 
aged units (particularly those with children under 18) are undoubtedly using some of 
their incomes to support more than just themselves, while other aged units 
undoubtedly receiving some additional support from other family members.  The 
definition of income could also be expanded to include such nonmonetary sources as 
food stamps, housing assistance, and health care.  This would create a more complete 
picture of the economic resources available to the elderly through a variety of 
government programs.  Finally, more different types of COLA reduction plans could 
be considered.  Possibilities include using a reduction other than one percentage point, 
starting the COLA reductions at a different age such as the normal retirement age or 
the age of 70, or only applying the COLA reductions to particular income groups.   
Another possible avenue for research is the interaction between the level of the 
COLA reduction and the general health of the economy.  In particular, if the economy 
is performing poorly, does the COLA reduction include some type of automatic 
stabilizer so that benefits would not be decreased as much?  However, Figure 2 
demonstrates why this question is difficult to answer; the relationship between benefits 
and inflation rates is highly nonlinear around the 1% inflation level, even if some 
agreement could be made about precisely which inflation rates are associated with 
strong economic performance. 
In conclusion, COLA reductions should not be overlooked in the debate over 
Social Security reform. 
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Figure 1: Sources of Income for the Elderly, March 2000 CPS 



































 Social Security  Pensions  Assets
 Earnings  Other



























 Social Security  Pensions  Assets
 Earnings  Other
1 3 5 7 936 
Figure 2: Effects of a 1 Percentage Point COLA Reduction  
on the Level of Benefits by Age for Different Rates of Constant Inflation 
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Figure 3: Effects of a 1 Percentage Point COLA Reduction 
on the Level of Benefits by Age for Different Rates of Constant Inflation 
 























































































































New COLA: 20 Years Ago; Ages 62-85











































New COLA: 60 Years Ago; Ages 62-85








Figure 4: Effect of a 1 % Point COLA Reduction on Benefit Levels by Age 
For Stochastic Simulations of Future Inflation Rates:  
10% quantile, median, and 90% quantile 
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Figure 5: Effects of a 1 % Point COLA Reduction on Benefit Levels by Age 
For Stochastic Simulations of Future Inflation Rates:  
10% quantile, median, and 90% quantile 











































New COLA: 60 Years Ago; Ages 62-75











































New COLA: 60 Years Ago; Ages 62-80






New COLA: 20 Years Ago; Ages 62-85





































New COLA: 60 Years Ago; Ages 62-85




Changes in the Social Security Benefits of Aged Units  
After a COLA Reduction of One Percentage Point 
     
Benefit if COLA 
Reduction Began 
 1 Year Ago 
Benefit if COLA 
Reduction Began 
20 Years Ago 
Benefit if COLA 
Reduction Began 
60 Years Ago 
















Elderly  $10,723  $10,619  -1.0%  $9,560  -10.9%  $9,500  -11.4% 
               
65-74  $10,549  $10,448  -1.0%  $9,827  -6.8%  $9,827  -6.8% 



















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Ages 65-74: 87.2% of aged units receive Social Security Benefits 
Ages 75-84: 93.3% of aged units receive Social Security Benefits 
Ages 85 +  : 92.8% of aged units receive Social Security Benefits 
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Table 2: Effects of a COLA Reduction on Mean Income by Income Decile 
for Length of Time Since Passage of COLA Reduction and for Different Ages in Which the COLA Reduction Applies, 
 All Aged Units 
                       
  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Tenth 
 
Mean Income of 
Aged Units  $3,899  $7,984  $10,456  $13,200  $16,727  $20,896  $26,131  $34,111  $48,273  $110,587 
                       
1 Year Ago  $3,869  $7,917  $10,369  $13,103  $16,618  $20,777  $26,003  $33,976  $48,139  $110,451 
Change (%)  -0.8%  -0.8%  -0.8%  -0.7%  -0.7%  -0.6%  -0.5%  -0.4%  -0.3%  -0.1% 
                     
20 Years Ago  $3,532  $7,139  $9,341  $12,003  $15,420  $19,509  $24,716  $32,706  $46,945  $109,291 
Change (%)  -9.4%  -10.6%  -10.7%  -9.1%  -7.8%  -6.6%  -5.4%  -4.1%  -2.8%  -1.2% 
                     




























Change (%)  -10.2%  -11.5%  -11.6%  -9.7%  -8.2%  -6.9%  -5.6%  -4.2%  -2.8%  -1.2% 
                       
1 Year Ago  $3,884  $7,953  $10,419  $13,154  $16,671  $20,829  $26,056  $34,023  $48,178  $110,487 
Change (%)  -0.4%  -0.4%  -0.4%  -0.3%  -0.3%  -0.3%  -0.3%  -0.3%  -0.2%  -0.1% 
                     
20 Years Ago  $3,632  $7,394  $9,670  $12,328  $15,737  $19,803  $24,991  $32,940  $47,129  $109,476 
Change (%)  -6.9%  -7.4%  -7.5%  -6.6%  -5.9%  -5.2%  -4.4%  -3.4%  -2.4%  -1.0% 
                     



























Change (%)  -7.7%  -8.4%  -8.6%  -7.3%  -6.4%  -5.6%  -4.6%  -3.6%  -2.4%  -1.0% 
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Table 2 (cont.): Effects of a COLA Reduction on Mean Income by Income Decile 
for Length of Time Since Passage of COLA Reduction and for Different Ages in Which the COLA Reduction Applies, 
 All Aged Units 
                       
  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Tenth 
 
Mean Income of Aged 
Units  $3,899  $7,984  $10,456  $13,200  $16,727  $20,896  $26,131  $34,111  $48,273  $110,587 
                       
1 Year Ago  $3,878  $7,940  $10,397  $13,133  $16,646  $20,804  $26,029  $33,997  $48,154  $110,466 
Change (%)  -0.6%  -0.6%  -0.6%  -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.4%  -0.4%  -0.3%  -0.2%  -0.1% 
                     
20 Years Ago  $3,580  $7,262  $9,499  $12,147  $15,547  $19,622  $24,814  $32,789  $47,006  $109,357 
Change (%)  -8.2%  -9.0%  -9.2%  -8.0%  -7.1%  -6.1%  -5.0%  -3.9%  -2.6%  -1.1% 
                     



























Change (%)  -9.0%  -10.1%  -10.2%  -8.7%  -7.5%  -6.4%  -5.3%  -4.0%  -2.7%  -1.1% 
                       
1 Year Ago  $3,873  $7,928  $10,383  $13,115  $16,628  $20,785  $26,010  $33,983  $48,144  $110,455 
Change (%)  -0.7%  -0.7%  -0.7%  -0.6%  -0.6%  -0.5%  -0.5%  -0.4%  -0.3%  -0.1% 
                     
20 Years Ago  $3,550  $7,188  $9,406  $12,054  $15,459  $19,540  $24,741  $32,725  $46,963  $109,309 
Change (%)  -9.0%  -10.0%  -10.0%  -8.7%  -7.6%  -6.5%  -5.3%  -4.1%  -2.7%  -1.2% 
                     



























Change (%)  -9.8%  -11.0%  -11.1%  -9.4%  -8.0%  -6.8%  -5.5%  -4.2%  -2.8%  -1.2% 
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Table 3: Effects of a COLA Reduction on Mean Income by Income Decile 
for Length of Time Since Passage of COLA Reduction and for Different Ages in which the COLA Reduction Applies, 
 Ages 85 and Older 
                       
  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Tenth 
 
Mean Income of 
Aged Units  $3,323  $7,056  $8,505  $9,960  $11,566  $13,617  $16,337  $20,553  $28,306  $65,729 
                       
1 Year Ago  $3,297  $6,994  $8,431  $9,873  $11,469  $13,518  $16,226  $20,423  $28,171  $65,564 
Change (%)  -0.8%  -0.9%  -0.9%  -0.9%  -0.8%  -0.7%  -0.7%  -0.6%  -0.5%  -0.3% 
                     
20 Years Ago  $2,849  $5,936  $7,180  $8,389  $9,821  $11,847  $14,347  $18,236  $25,911  $62,824 
Change (%)  -14.3%  -15.9%  -15.6%  -15.8%  -15.1%  -13.0%  -12.2%  -11.3%  -8.5%  -4.4% 
                     




























Change (%)  -18.7%  -20.6%  -20.5%  -20.6%  -20.1%  -16.4%  -15.2%  -14.1%  -10.3%  -5.4% 
                       
1 Year Ago  $3,323  $7,055  $8,505  $9,960  $11,566  $13,617  $16,336  $20,551  $28,303  $65,725 
Change (%)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
                     
20 Years Ago  $3,174  $6,687  $8,086  $9,456  $11,065  $12,972  $15,563  $19,646  $27,294  $64,504 
Change (%)  -4.5%  -5.2%  -4.9%  -5.1%  -4.3%  -4.7%  -4.7%  -4.4%  -3.6%  -1.9% 
                     



























Change (%)  -9.4%  -10.4%  -10.3%  -10.4%  -9.9%  -8.6%  -8.1%  -7.5%  -5.7%  -3.0% 
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Table 3 (cont.): Effects of a COLA Reduction on Mean Income by Income Decile 
for Length of Time Since Passage of COLA Reduction and for Different Ages in which the COLA Reduction Applies, 
 Ages 85 and Older 
                       
  First  Second  Third  Fourth  Fifth  Sixth  Seventh  Eighth  Ninth  Tenth 
 
Mean Income of 
Aged Units  $3,323  $7,056  $8,505  $9,960  $11,566  $13,617  $16,337  $20,553  $28,306  $65,729 
                       
1 Year Ago  $3,323  $7,055  $8,505  $9,960  $11,566  $13,616  $16,334  $20,547  $28,298  $65,717 
Change (%)  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0%  0.0% 
                     
20 Years Ago  $3,064  $6,423  $7,789  $9,090  $10,654  $12,540  $15,090  $19,109  $26,735  $63,831 
Change (%)  -7.8%  -9.0%  -8.4%  -8.7%  -7.9%  -7.9%  -7.6%  -7.0%  -5.5%  -2.9% 
                     



























Change (%)  -12.7%  -14.2%  -13.9%  -14.1%  -13.5%  -11.6%  -10.9%  -10.1%  -7.6%  -4.0% 
                       
1 Year Ago  $3,318  $7,045  $8,493  $9,943  $11,554  $13,596  $16,304  $20,508  $28,257  $65,668 
Change (%)  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.1%  -0.2%  -0.1%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.2%  -0.1% 
                     
20 Years Ago  $2,950  $6,155  $7,473  $8,716  $10,234  $12,123  $14,632  $18,588  $26,209  $63,191 
Change (%)  -11.2%  -12.8%  -12.1%  -12.5%  -11.5%  -11.0%  -10.4%  -9.6%  -7.4%  -3.9% 
                     



























Change (%)  -16.0%  -17.8%  -17.5%  -17.7%  -16.9%  -14.5%  -13.6%  -12.5%  -9.4%  -4.9% 
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Table 4: 





Actual     
Poverty  $7,990  $10,070 
Threshold   
$7,990  5161  0 
$10,070  782  3996 
$11,156  186  328 
$11,440  20  0 
$13,032  377  457 
$13,410  87  48 
$13,423  9  0 
$16,895  28  12 
$16,954  1  0 
$17,184  106  100 
$17,465  85  47 
$19,882  12  2 
$20,380  72  19 
$20,723  35  12 
$21,024  45  21 
$22,261  5  0 
$22,964  27  4 
$23,436  28  11 
$23,835  3  2 
$23,930  10  7 
$24,934  2  1 
$25,828  17  3 
$26,595  12  5 
$27,006  12  9 
$27,425  2  1 
$27,596  6  2 
$28,327  3  2 
$29,206  4  3 
$29,899  8  2 
$30,387  2  0 
$30,673  1  0 
$30,944  6  1 
$33,708  2  0 
$34,554  2  1 
$35,489  6  0 
$36,169  1  0 
$37,076  0  1 
     
Total  7165  5097 46 
Table 5: 
Percentage of Aged Units with Income below the Poverty Level After a COLA Reduction of One Percentage Point, 
ALL AGED UNITS 




62 - 120 
20 Years 
62 - 120 
60 Years 
62 - 75 
60 Years 
62 - 80 
60 Years 
62 - 85 
60 Years 
All Aged Units  25,200,000  15.9%  19.9%  20.5%  19.0%  19.7%  20.0% 
               
By Age               
Ages 65-74  12,900,000  14.6%  16.5%  16.5%  16.4%  16.5%  16.5% 
Ages 75-84  9,362,568  15.6%  20.9%  20.9%  19.5%  20.8%  20.9% 
Ages 85 +  2,889,808  22.4%  32.3%  36.9%  28.7%  31.0%  33.0% 
               
By Gender, Marital Status, and Age             
Married Couples, 65-74  6,461,332  4.8%  5.4%  5.4%  5.4%  5.4%  5.4% 
Unmarried Males, 65-74  1,878,304  21.9%  24.5%  24.5%  24.5%  24.5%  24.5% 
Unmarried Females, 65-74  4,589,762  25.4%  28.7%  28.7%  28.7%  28.7%  28.7% 
               
Married Couples, 75-84  3,377,998  5.0%  6.7%  6.7%  6.4%  6.6%  6.7% 
Unmarried Males, 75-84  1,428,762  13.9%  20.6%  20.6%  18.8%  20.4%  20.6% 
Unmarried Females, 75-84  4,555,808  23.9%  31.5%  31.6%  29.5%  31.4%  31.6% 
               
Married Couples, 85 +  551,820  4.0%  6.4%  7.4%  5.7%  5.7%  7.4% 
Unmarried Males, 85 +  493,918  17.8%  26.4%  31.3%  22.6%  24.2%  26.4% 
Unmarried Females, 85 +  1,844,070  29.1%  41.6%  47.3%  37.2%  40.4%  42.4% 
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Table 6: 
Percentage of Aged Units with Income below the Poverty Level After a COLA Reduction of One Percentage Point, 
ONLY AGED UNITS RECEIVING SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS 




62 - 120 
20 Years 
62 - 120 
60 Years 
62 - 75 
60 Years 
62 - 80 
60 Years 
62 - 85 
60 Years 
All Aged Units  22,700,000  13.1%  17.6%  18.2%  16.5%  17.4%  17.7% 
               
By Age               
Ages 65-74  11,300,000  11.8%  14.0%  14.0%  13.9%  14.0%  14.0% 
Ages 75-84  8,726,573  12.8%  18.5%  18.6%  17.1%  18.4%  18.6% 
Ages 85 +  2,657,285  19.0%  29.7%  34.8%  25.8%  28.4%  30.5% 
               
By Gender, Marital Status, and Age             
Married Couples, 65-74  5,758,693  3.3%  4.0%  4.0%  3.9%  4.0%  4.0% 
Unmarried Males, 65-74  1,544,093  18.6%  21.7%  21.7%  21.7%  21.7%  21.7% 
Unmarried Females, 65-74  4,012,459  21.5%  25.3%  25.3%  25.3%  25.3%  25.3% 
               
Married Couples, 75-84  3,183,321  3.1%  4.9%  4.9%  4.6%  4.8%  4.9% 
Unmarried Males, 75-84  1,279,523  9.8%  17.2%  17.2%  15.1%  16.9%  17.2% 
Unmarried Females, 75-84  4,263,729  21.0%  29.1%  29.2%  27.0%  29.0%  29.2% 
               
Married Couples, 85 +  522,632  2.2%  4.7%  5.7%  4.0%  4.0%  5.7% 
Unmarried Males, 85 +  431,579  13.5%  23.3%  28.9%  19.0%  20.8%  23.3% 
Unmarried Females, 85 +  1,703,074  25.6%  39.0%  45.2%  34.3%  37.8%  39.9% 
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Table 7: 




Value of Poverty 
Gap (in billion $) 
Additional Poverty Gap 
from COLA Reduction 
(in billions $) 
Percent 
Growth 
        
  All Aged Units 
        
Present Law  $11.8  ---  --- 
COLA, 62 - 120  $15.8  $4.0  33.5% 
COLA, 62 - 75  $14.2  $2.4  20.0% 
COLA, 62 - 80  $14.9  $3.1  25.9% 
COLA, 62 - 85  $15.3  $3.5  29.4% 
        
  Aged Units Not Living With Any Other Family Members 
        
Present Law  $6.3  ---  --- 
COLA, 62 - 120  $9.1  $2.8  23.4% 
COLA, 62 - 75  $7.9  $1.6  13.6% 
COLA, 62 - 80  $8.4  $2.1  17.9% 
COLA, 62 - 85  $8.8  $2.4  20.5% 
        
  Aged Units Living With Other Family Members 
        
Present Law  $5.5  ---  --- 
COLA, 62 - 120  $6.7  $1.2  10.1% 
COLA, 62 - 75  $6.2  $0.7  6.3% 
COLA, 62 - 80  $6.4  $0.9  8.0% 





Summary Statistics of Relevant SSI Variables 
 
   Not Eligible  Eligible 
  
Not 
Participating  Participating 
Not 
Participating  Participating 
$32,613   $17,091   $3,590   $7,148   Total Income 
($37,290)  ($14,166)  ($3,177)  ($2,723) 
$11,857   $8,612   $2,730   $2,363        Social Security 
     Benefits  ($6,616)  ($4,217)  ($2,672)  ($2,459) 
$0   $3,401   $0   $4,481        SSI Benefits 
$0   ($3,779)  $0   ($3,242) 
$7,350   $2,147   $524   $165        Earnings 
($24,963)  ($9,693)  ($2,196)  ($1,017) 
$6,408   $752   $99   $34        Assets 
($18,113)  ($4,526)  ($1,350)  ($269) 
$6,323   $1,234   $142   $21        Pensions 
($12,098)  ($4,206)  ($664)  ($199) 
3.54   1.53   0.43   0.32   Pre-SSI Income / Poverty 
Threshold  (3.83)  (1.36)  (0.37)  (0.31) 
$28,620   $12,339   $3,178   $2,428   Countable Income for 
SSI  ($29,427)  ($9,716)  ($2,486)  ($2,369) 
$0   $0   $3,212   $3,930   Calculated SSI Federal 
Benefit  $0   $0   ($2,494)  ($2,614) 
$57   $89   $55   $69   Maximum Possible State 
Benefit  ($107)  ($135)  ($88)  ($114) 
0.25   0.60   0.22   0.57   Disabled? (0/1) 
(0.43)  (0.49)  (0.41)  (0.49) 
0.42   0.56   0.64   0.65   Gender (0/1 1=female) 
(0.49)  (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.48) 
0.44   0.34   0.17   0.17   Married? (0/1) 
(0.50)  (0.47)  (0.38)  (0.38) 
0.94   0.97   0.58   0.53   Receive Social Security? 
(0/1)  (0.24)  (0.18)  (0.49)  (0.50) 
0.24   0.10   0.10   0.04   Any Earnings? (0/1) 
(0.43)  (0.31)  (0.29)  (0.19) 
0.67   0.22   0.23   0.10   Any Asset Income? (0/1) 
(0.47)  (0.42)  (0.42)  (0.29) 
Number of Observations  10743  187  925  407 
Standard errors in parentheses 50 
Table 9: 
Probit Estimates for Probability of Participating in SSI 
For those Eligible for Federal SSI benefits 
 
  Coefficient  Derivative  x-bar 
-1.308*  ---  --- 
(0.193)     
Intercept 
     
0.009*  0.0029  34.06 
(0.003)     
Calculated SSI 
Federal Benefit  
( x 100 )       
1.044*  0.2671  0.3326 
(0.081)     
Disabled? (0/1) 
     
0.124*  0.0414  0.539 
(0.044)     
State Generosity 
 ( x 100 ) 
     
-0.087  -0.0291  0.4857 
(0.079)     
Age Dummy (0/1) 
( 1 = 75+ ) 
     
0.113  0.0372  0.6674 
(0.105)     
Gender (0/1) 
( 1 = female ) 
     
-0.06  -0.0197  0.1777 
(0.140)     
Married? (0/1) 
     
0.193  0.0638  0.5773 
(0.133)     
Receive Social 
Security? (0/1) 
     
-0.390  -0.1164  0.0826 
(0.179)     
Any Earnings? (0/1) 
     
-0.543*  -0.1608  0.1877 
(0.115)     
Any Asset Income? 
(0/1) 
     
       
Number of 
Observations  1332     
  * Significance at 1% level. 51 
Table 10: 
Characteristics for Different SSI Eligibility Groups 
Assuming COLA Reduction Enacted 60 Years Ago 
 
  1  2  3  4  5 
Receives SSI:  Yes  No  No  No  Yes 
Eligible for SSI:  No  No  Yes  No  Yes 
Eligible for SSI  
After COLA Reduction:  Both*  No  Yes  Yes  Yes 
            
Number  187  10347  925  396  407 
Probability of Uptake (Pre)  32.88%  13.62%  24.94%  22.27%  42.80% 
Probability of Uptake (Post)  33.40%  13.62%  25.74%  23.48%  43.63% 
Calc. Federal SSI Elig. (Pre)  $0  $0  $3,212  $0  $3,930 
Calc. Federal SSI Elig. (Post)  $192  $0  $3,546  $530  $4,210 
Countable Income for SSI (Pre)  $12,339  $29,415  $3,178  $7,017  $2,428 
Countable Income for SSI 
(Post)  $11,298  $28,056  $2,845  $5,781  $2,148 
SSI Benefits  $3,401  $0  $0  $0  $4,481 
Pre-SSI Income / Poverty 
Threshold  1.532611  3.638565  0.429331  0.882815  0.322561 
Maximum State Benefit  $89  $57  $55  $44  $69 
Disabled? (0/1)  59.88%  24.40%  21.63%  33.32%  57.35% 
Gender (0/1) ( 1 = female )  55.72%  41.00%  64.08%  77.33%  65.44% 
Married? (0/1)  33.55%  45.53%  17.43%  11.35%  16.95% 




The Effects of the COLA Reduction Plans on Federal SSI Payment Obligations 
 
 














1  393,210  32.9%  33.4%  $1,337,189,813  $1,413,118,864 
2  21,300,000  13.6%  13.6%  $0  $0 
3  1,867,360  24.9%  25.7%  $0  $32,907,073 
4  784,274  22.3%  23.5%  $0  $99,553,861 
5  816,645  42.8%  43.6%  $3,659,315,994  $3,887,996,846 
           
Total  25,200,000  16.0%  16.1%  $4,996,505,807  $5,433,576,643 
           
Additional Cost to Federal SSI Programs:  $437,070,836   
Subgroups: (1) Receive SSI though not eligible, (2) Not eligible for SSI and not 
receive SSI, (3) Eligible for SSI but not receiving SSI, (4) Not receiving SSI though 
would become eligible for SSI After the COLA Reduction, (5) Receiving and eligible 
for  SSI. 
 














1  393,210  32.9%  33.2%  $1,337,189,813  $1,377,584,203 
2  21,600,000  13.7%  13.7%  $0  $0 
3  1,867,360  24.9%  25.5%  $0  $21,549,887 
4  506,971  21.9%  22.7%  $0  $41,484,079 
5  816,645  42.8%  43.5%  $3,659,315,994  $3,845,462,908 
  0         
Total  25,200,000  16.0%  16.1%  $4,996,505,807  $5,286,081,076 
           
Additional Cost to Federal SSI Programs:  $289,575,269   
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Table 11 (cont.): 














1  393,210  32.9%  33.3%  $1,337,189,813  $1,393,985,728 
2  21,500,000  13.7%  13.7%  $0  $0 
3  1,867,360  24.9%  25.7%  $0  $27,110,948 
4  638,937  21.3%  22.3%  $0  $64,034,642 
5  816,645  42.8%  43.6%  $3,659,315,994  $3,870,570,216 
  0         
Total  25,200,000  16.0%  16.1%  $4,996,505,807  $5,355,701,534 
           



















1  393,210  32.9%  33.3%  $1,337,189,813  $1,404,019,535 
2  21,400,000  13.7%  13.7%  $0  $0 
3  1,867,360  24.9%  25.7%  $0  $30,393,338 
4  734,868  21.8%  22.8%  $0  $80,955,765 
5  816,645  42.8%  43.6%  $3,659,315,994  $3,881,793,026 
  0         
Total  25,200,000  16.0%  16.1%  $4,996,505,807  $5,397,161,664 
           
Additional Cost to Federal SSI Programs:  $400,655,857   54 
Table 12: 
The Effects of the COLA Reduction Plans on the Trust Fund Balance 
Assuming COLA Reduction Enacted 60 years Ago 
 
 
Total Value of Benefits 
Paid to Aged Units in 
1999 (in billions $) 
Savings from 
Present Law 




Present Law  $272.5  $0.0  0.0% 
COLA, 62 - 120  $241.3  $31.2  73.0% 
COLA, 62 - 75  $247.5  $24.9  58.4% 
COLA, 62 - 80  $243.7  $28.7  67.2% 
COLA, 62 - 85  $242.0  $30.4  71.2% 
 